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Footnotes
1. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2012).
2. Id. at 1970.
3. Id. at 1980
4. Id. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For readers who would like to review the truly momentouscases of the Supreme Court’s last Term, I heartily recom-mend Professor Todd E. Pettys’s article, More than Mar-
riage: Civil Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2012-2013 Term, which
also appears in this issue of Court Review. During this past
Term, like the one before it, the real blockbusters were on the
civil side.  But the Court’s criminal docket was not without its
charms.  The justices wrestled with the collection of DNA evi-
dence from arrestees, canine sniffs at the front door, non-custo-
dial suspects’ silence in the face of questioning, and increased
minimum sentences based on facts not submitted to the jury.
This article reviews these and other criminal cases that may
most interest jurists and lawyers in state courts, and concludes
with a brief glimpse at the October 2013 Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Of all the criminal-law-related rulings this past Term, the
Fourth Amendment decisions were perhaps the most signifi-
cant.  The Court issued important holdings on collecting foren-
sic evidence (DNA and blood) without a warrant, using nar-
cotics detection dogs, and detaining residents during a warrant
search.  The decisions regarding blood draws (Missouri v.
McNeely) and detentions (Bailey v. United States) matter a lot in
day-to-day policing.  The DNA case (Maryland v. King) may
well spur state legislatures to enact or revise laws for obtaining
DNA from arrestees.  Altogether, these rulings will influence
police and courts for many years to come.
DNA, BLOOD, AND WARRANTS
In Maryland v. King,1 an important and much-awaited ruling,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent
the government from obtaining and analyzing arrestees’ DNA.
Alonzo King was arrested for assault for allegedly menacing a
group of people with a shotgun.  At booking, jail personnel used
a cheek swab to take a DNA sample, pursuant to the provisions
of the Maryland DNA Collection Act.  The sample was analyzed,
and King’s DNA profile was uploaded into Maryland’s DNA data-
base.  It was subsequently forwarded to the national database
supervised by The FBI (CODIS), and matched to a DNA profile
from a DNA sample collected in an unsolved 2003 rape case.
King was convicted of rape, but the Maryland Court of Appeals
struck down part of the Act authorizing officers to collect DNA
from felony arrestees.  The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4
decision authored by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, and Alito.
The Court found that the process of obtaining a DNA sam-
ple was a search, but that the search was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  The legitimate govern-
ment interests served by the Act are well-established and
include “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and
accurate way to process and identify the persons and posses-
sions they must take into custody.”2 Justice Kennedy described
the process of obtaining a DNA sample and adding it to various
databases.  In a lengthy portion of the opinion, the majority
contended that obtaining an arrestee’s DNA is a critical part of
identifying the arrestee so that the government will know with
certainty who is in its possession, whether the arrestee poses a
danger and should (for example) not be released on bail, and
other matters.  The Court analogized to fingerprint evidence
and an old photo-based system of categorizing arrestees.  The
justices also noted the gentle process for obtaining a swab, com-
pared with a venipuncture or surgical procedure, and appeared
reassured by the protections of the Act, which requires the DNA
profile to be entered in the database only after a judicial officer
finds probable cause to detain.  Further, the DNA sample must
be destroyed if the individual is acquitted or unconditionally
pardoned.  The majority concluded that the “DNA identifica-
tion of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered
part of a routine booking procedure.”3
Justice Scalia penned the dissent, arguing that the category
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches does not
include searches designed to serve the ordinary needs of law
enforcement.  In the view of the dissenting justices, the Mary-
land Act and the process followed in King’s case were in no way
focused upon identifying King or in serving any other adminis-
trative purpose.  The dissent is a frankly devastating rejoinder
to the claim that the evidence was obtained for identification
purposes.  The dissenters summed their position up this way:
“DNA testing does not even begin until after arraignment and
bail decisions are already made.  The samples sit in storage for
months, and take weeks to test.  When they are tested, they are
checked against” profiles in a federal database of unsolved
crimes, rather than the profiles in the database of individuals
who have been arrested and convicted, “which could be used to
identify them.”4
The dissenting justices also disagreed with the analogy to
fingerprint identification, as well as the majority’s claim that the
process of DNA testing and entry into the national registry
could take much less time in the future.  According to the dis-
senters, the question was whether King’s search was reasonable,
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Sotomayor also rejected a categorical rule proposed by the Chief
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18. Id. at 1055-56.
not whether some hypothetical search in the future would be.  
Turning from DNA to blood, the issue in Missouri v.
McNeely5 was whether the natural metabolism of alcohol in the
blood stream amounts to a per se exigency, thus allowing offi-
cers to obtain blood samples without a warrant in all drunk-dri-
ving cases.  In a 5-4 ruling, the Court rejected the argument,
and required the government to establish exigent circumstances
on a case-by-case basis.
The majority’s opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor,
noted that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only
if it falls within a recognized exception, such as exigent cir-
cumstances.  The Court examined its prior ruling in Schmerber
v. California,6 where a blood draw was permitted.  That case, the
majority said, fit comfortably within decisions applying the exi-
gent-circumstances exception.  A significant delay in testing
will negatively affect the probative value of the test results.
However, “it does not follow that we should part from careful
case-by-case assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical
rule proposed by the State.”7 “[W]here police officers can rea-
sonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn
without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search,
the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”8 Justice
Kennedy joined the majority opinion but wrote separately to
say that this case did not provide an appropriate vehicle to give
greater guidance to law enforcement about the existence of exi-
gent circumstances.9
Four justices dissented in whole or in part.  The primary dis-
sent was written by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by two oth-
ers); it contended that “[a] police officer reading this Court’s
opinion would have no idea—no idea—what the Fourth
Amendment requires of him, once he decides to obtain a blood
sample from a drunk driving suspect who has refused a breath-
alyzer test.”10 The Chief Justice underscored the evanescence
of blood evidence.  The destruction of alcohol in the blood
stream “is not simply a belief. . . ; it is a biological certainty. . . .
Evidence is literally disappearing by the minute.”11 Noting that
many jurisdictions provide for electronic warrant applications,
and that there may be time to obtain a warrant in many cases,
these three Justices also rejected the State’s proposed rule.  But
they propounded a different test, providing for an exception to
the warrant requirement if an officer could reasonably conclude
that there was not time to seek and receive a warrant before
blood could be drawn, or if the officer did not receive a
response before blood could be drawn.12 Justice Thomas also
dissented.  In his view, the rapid destruction of evidence should
permit a warrantless blood draw in every situation where police
have probable cause to arrest a
drunk driver.13
THE DOGGY DUO
Two “canine sniff” cases
issued during the past Term.
The first was Florida v. Harris,14
where all members of the Court
agreed that if a dog “alert” pro-
vides probable cause to search,
the Fourth Amendment does
not require the State to present
an extensive set of records to
establish the dog’s reliability.
The case arose from a routine
traffic stop.  A sheriff’s officer
pulled over a truck, noticed that
the driver appeared nervous, and that he had an open can of
beer.  After consent to search was refused, the deputy returned
to the car with his narcotics detection dog, Aldo, who “alerted”
on the driver’s side door handle.  A search of the car did not dis-
close any of the drugs that the dog was trained to detect, but the
officer found pseudoephedrine, which is used in manufacturing
methamphetamine.  While the defendant was out on bail, he
encountered the officer and dog once more, and the dog again
“alerted” on the door. This time nothing was found.  The
Florida Supreme Court found that to demonstrate a dog’s relia-
bility and establish probable cause, the State needed to produce
more than simply the fact that the dog had been trained and
certified.  The dog’s training and certification records, experi-
ence and training of the officer handling the dog, and field per-
formance records must also be produced.15
Reversing, the Court emphasized that its prior decisions
established that probable cause is a “practical and common-sen-
sical standard,” in which one looks at the totality of the circum-
stances.16 The test “is not reducible to ‘precise definition or
quantification.’”17 Noting that the Court has “rejected rigid rules,
bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more
flexible, all-things-considered approach,” the justices unani-
mously rejected the ruling below.18 The defendant argued that
the dog had actually shown himself untrustworthy, because he
twice indicated that particular drugs were present, but they could
not be found. The Court was not persuaded, perhaps influenced
by the claim that the door had residual odor from the driver’s
hands.  Moreover, the justices were not convinced that docu-
ments such as field performance records were necessarily accu-
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Fourth Amendment,” citing Jardines).
31. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 300 P.3d 72, 78 (Kan. 2013) (officer
“affirmatively chose to conceal his identify by covering the [apart-
ment door] peephole and affirmatively positioning himself to
block the occupant’s ability to determine who was standing at the
door . . . .   ‘No customary invitation’ permits approaching some-
one’s door in this manner,” quoting Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416);
McClintock v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7124, 7 (Tex. App.
Houston 1st Dist. June 11, 2013) (dog sniff within curtilage
“exceeds the implicit license granted by custom that allows
strangers to approach a home and briefly solicit its occupants . . .”).
rate, since they would not contain
(for example) false negatives.
Harris is not of great import,
other than to signal the Court’s
current reluctance to assess the
overall reliability of narcotics
detection dogs.19 The other half
of the doggy duo is much more
significant.  
Florida v. Jardines20 presented
the question of whether a dog
sniff at a front door is a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Officers
received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in
Jardines’s home.  Two detectives, including one with a drug-
sniffing dog, went onto the front porch of the home.  The dog,
Franky,21 sat down at the base of the front door, indicating the
strongest location for odors he was trained to detect.  On the
basis of the dog’s behavior, a detective obtained a warrant, and
a subsequent search revealed marijuana plants.  The Florida
Supreme Court found that the use of the dog was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment that was not
supported by probable cause.  In a 5-4 decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia drew on his opinion in
the previous Term’s blockbuster, United States v. Jones, for the
proposition that a search occurs “[w]hen ‘the Government
obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses,
papers, or effects . . . .”22 That part of Jones had garnered five
votes, but a different group of five than in Jardines. Nevertheless,
the Jardines majority found that officers were in the curtilage of
the house—“the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated
with the home’”—which enjoys protection as part of the home
itself.23 The justices determined that the implicit license typi-
cally granted to visitors to approach a home does not extend to
officers who bring a trained dog to explore the area in the hopes
of discovering incriminating evidence.  There is no customary
invitation for that act.24 The Fourth Amendment right to be free
in one’s home from unreasonable governmental intrusion
“would be of little practical value if the State’s agents could stand
in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with
impunity.”25 Justice Kagan authored a concurrence for three of
the justices in the majority, finding in addition that the action
was a search because it infringed on a reasonable expectation of
privacy,26 a point the majority opinion did not address.
Justice Alito dissented in an opinion joined by the Chief Jus-
tice, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.  They argued that “[t]he
law of trespass generally gives members of the public a license
to use a walkway to approach the front door of a house and to
remain there for a brief time.”27 They saw no basis to distin-
guish between welcome and unwelcome visitors, and of course
this implied license to approach the front door extends to the
police because officers are ordinarily allowed to approach a
front door, knock, and attempt to speak to an occupant.  The
detectives did not exceed the scope of this license when they
used a dog at the front door.  In addition, the dissenting justices
would find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to odors emanating from the home that may be
detected by a person or a dog. They noted that a previous deci-
sion already rejected the claim that the use of a narcotics dog is
the same as using a thermal-imaging device.28
Jardines is important for several reasons.  Of course, it is sig-
nificant for limiting what officers may do with a narcotics detec-
tion dog.  But more generally, it is the first Supreme Court rul-
ing interpreting the landmark Jones case.  It marks something of
a shift in even Justice Scalia’s analysis of a property-based the-
ory of a search.  In Jones, Justice Scalia tied his historical analy-
sis of the Fourth Amendment to common-law trespass.29 In
Jardines, his opinion for the majority does not even contain the
word trespass, although it still takes a property-based approach.
In the wake of Jardines, some courts have analyzed whether offi-
cers were within the scope of the “license” granted to ordinary
visitors. Some courts reference the law of trespass30 while oth-
ers do not.31
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DETENTIONS DURING WARRANT SEARCHES
Over 20 years ago, the Court decided Michigan v. Summers,32
and upheld the detention of a resident during the search of his
home.  Summers was walking down his front steps when he was
detained.  The defendant in this Term’s case, Bailey v. United
States,33 was detained about a mile from his home, where officers
were about to execute a search warrant.  In a 6-3 decision
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court determined that the
detention could not be upheld as incident to a lawful search.34
The majority found that the law-enforcement interests listed
in Summers did not support Bailey’s detention.  First, detaining
someone who has left the premises is not necessary for reasons
of officer safety; police can mitigate any risk by taking routine
precautions, such as posting someone near the door in the
event a resident returns.  Second, detention of a former occu-
pant is unnecessary to facilitate the orderly completion of the
search.  Third, detention does not serve the interest of prevent-
ing any damage to the integrity of the search.35 According to
the Court, “[t]he categorical authority to detain incident to the
execution of a search warrant must be limited to the immediate
vicinity of the premises to be searched,” and Bailey was
detained “at a point beyond any reasonable understanding of
the immediate vicinity of the premises . . . .”36 Three of the jus-
tices in the majority also joined a concurring opinion by Justice
Scalia.  They wrote separately to emphasize that Summers estab-
lished a categorical, a bright-line rule, contrary to the Court of
Appeals’ balancing approach.  To resolve the issue in this case,
“a court need ask only one question: was the person seized
within ‘the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched?’”37 Conducting a Summers seizure incident to a
search is not a right that the government has; it is an exception
to the rule that would otherwise make the seizure unlawful.
“Summers embodies a categorical judgment that in one narrow
circumstance—the presence of occupants during the execution
of a search warrant—seizures are reasonable despite the
absence of probable cause.”38
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dis-
sented.  In their view, the stop and detention was reasonable
based on a variety of factors cited by the lower court, including
that the premises were subject to a valid search warrant, the
people detained were seen leaving the premises, and the deten-
tion was effected as soon as reasonably practicable.39 These jus-
tices also contended that a bright-line rule permitting the
search would be easily administered, while the majority’s
approach invites case-by-case liti-
gation over the definition of
“immediate vicinity.”40
FIFTH AMENDMENT
No Miranda cases made it onto
the docket this past Term.  The
justices issued only one Fifth
Amendment opinion, Salinas v. Texas.41 But Salinas will, in my
view, turn out to be quite significant over the long term.  It has
important implications for policing as well as for what it means
to take the nickel (assert the Fifth Amendment privilege).42
The defendant in Salinas was suspected of shooting two
brothers.  Officers came to his home, where he handed over his
shotgun and agreed to go with them to the police station for
questioning.  During a non-custodial interview, officers asked
him if his shotgun would match the shells found at the murder
scene.  Salinas did not answer and instead looked down at the
floor.  At trial, the State introduced evidence of his silence and
reaction.  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found no viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment, though the majority split on the
reasons.
Justice Alito delivered the judgment of the Court.  In an
opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, he
wrote that Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim failed because he
simply remained silent and did not expressly invoke the privi-
lege.  There are several circumstances in which an individual
need not expressly invoke to avail herself of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s protections.  A defendant “need not take the stand and
assert the privilege at his own trial,”43 and Griffin v. California44
prohibits comment on the decision not to testify.  Moreover,
due to the compelling pressures of an unwarned custodial inter-
rogation, an individual need not expressly invoke.  Likewise,
the privilege need not be affirmatively asserted where there are
threats, such as the withdrawal of government benefits,45 or
where assertion itself would be incriminating.46 But the three-
justice plurality declined to create what they characterized as
another exception to the invocation requirement; among other
reasons, mere silence in the face of questioning does not put
police on notice that the privilege is itself the reason for the
decision not to answer.47 And a contrary rule “would also be
very difficult to reconcile with Berghuis v. Thompkins,” where a
defendant in custody “failed to invoke the privilege when he
refused to respond to police questioning for 2 hours and 45
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minutes” after receiving Miranda
warnings.48 Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, con-
curred in the judgment.49 They
contended that “the Court’s deci-
sion in Griffin ‘lacks foundation
in the Constitution’s text, his-
tory, or logic’ and should not be
extended” to this case.50
Justice Breyer wrote for the
four dissenting justices.51 In
their view, the majority’s rule
undermines the Fifth Amend-
ment’s basic protections.  It has
long been held “that ‘no ritualis-
tic formula is necessary in order
to invoke the privilege,’” and Salinas was not represented by
counsel.52 Thompkins, the dissenters argued, is beside the
point, as that case concerned the admissibility of his later
speech, not comment on his silence after receiving Miranda
warnings.  And since the silence was in response to a question
aimed at determining if Salinas was guilty of murder, it would
be reasonable to infer that his silence derived from his exercise
of the privilege.53 The “need to categorize Salinas’ silence as
based on the Fifth Amendment” is supported by the predica-
ment of “forcing Salinas to choose between incrimination
through speech and incrimination through silence” and the
absence of any special reason why police had to know with cer-
tainty whether Salinas’ silence was in fact in reliance on the
Fifth Amendment.54
For police, at least, this is an important case.  Miranda warn-
ings need not be given when a suspect is interrogated but is not
in custody.  In many jurisdictions, officers have been trained in
techniques for questioning suspects, including—for example—
providing Beheler warnings, to increase the likelihood that even
interrogations in police stations might be found non-custo-
dial.55 Salinas increases the potential payoff of this approach.  If
officers are able to conduct a non-custodial interview or inter-
rogation, and a suspect does not expressly invoke, the State may
now comment on her silence.  The three-justice plurality also
suggested an additional tactic to obtain a confession: officers
might tell a non-custodial suspect that her silence may be used
against her in a future prosecution.56 By contrast, of course, the
prosecution cannot comment about silence after Miranda warn-
ings are given in a custodial interrogation, and the warnings
convey that principle.57
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The justices decided two important Sixth Amendment cases
during the last Term and ducked a third.  The most significant
of the decided cases was Alleyne v. United States, which was yet
another Apprendi holding.  The Court also addressed mistrials
and the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
RIGHT TO A JURY—APPRENDI ISSUES
Thirteen years ago, in the landmark decision in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, the Court ruled that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”58 Apprendi
held that a hate-crime allegation, which—if found to be true—
would increase the maximum possible sentence, is essentially an
element of the crime and must be submitted to a jury.  Two
years later, the Court decided Harris v. United States,59 deter-
mining that allegations that increase the minimum sentence
need not be submitted to the jury.  In this Term’s important case,
Alleyne v. United States,60 the justices overruled Harris, finding
no basis to distinguish facts that increase the minimum term of
a sentence and those that increase the maximum.
Allen Alleyne was charged with using or carrying a firearm in
relation to a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§924(c)(1)(A).  The offense carried a five-year mandatory min-
imum term.  The mandatory minimum term increased to seven
years if the firearm was “brandished.”  At trial, the jury indicated
on the verdict form that he had used or carried a firearm but did
not make any finding that the firearm was brandished.  At sen-
tencing, the District Court ruled that the evidence supported a
finding of brandishing, and Alleyne received seven years.  In a 5-
4 decision, the Court vacated the sentence on that count.
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas held that “[i]t is
impossible to dissociate the floor of the sentencing range from
the penalty affixed to the crime. . . .[C]riminal statutes have
long specified both the floor and ceiling of sentencing ranges,
which is evidence that both define the legally prescribed
penalty.”61 While the majority acknowledged the dissenters’
argument that the seven-year sentence for the §924(c) count
was authorized by the jury’s verdict, they found it to be “beside
the point.”62 “When a finding of fact alters the legally pre-
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scribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily
forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submit-
ted to the jury.  It is no answer to say that defendant could have
received the same sentence with or without that fact.”  Harris,
the Court held, was inconsistent with Apprendi, and was over-
ruled.63 Justice Breyer concurred and explained that he had
previously accepted Harris’s holding because he was not ready
to accept the rule in Apprendi. But now, over a decade later, “the
law should no longer tolerate the anomaly that the
Apprendi/Harris distinction creates.”64 Justice Sotomayor wrote
separately to explain why Harris should be overruled despite
the principles of stare decisis.65
The Chief Justice penned the primary dissent, arguing that
“[o]ur holdings that a judge may not sentence a defendant to
more than the jury has authorized properly preserve the jury
right as a guard against judicial overreaching.”66 Where, as
here, a sentence is imposed within the range authorized by the
jury’s verdict, there is no such risk of judicial overreaching.  The
jury’s verdict authorized the judge to impose a seven-year sen-
tence for precisely the reason he imposed it.  The Sixth Amend-
ment does not demand more.67 Justice Alito dissented sepa-
rately, arguing that while stare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand, “[i]f the Court is of a mind to reconsider existing prece-
dent, a prime candidate should be Apprendi . . . .”68
Alleyne is an important ruling, which state courts are begin-
ning to address.69 It may be worth noting that the federal courts
have already reached different outcomes on whether resentenc-
ing is required when an Alleyne error is found.  Several circuits
have found the error to be harmless, but others have automati-
cally reversed.70
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A Michigan statute defines the offense of burning a dwelling
house.  Even though the evidence suggested that the defendant
in Evans v. Michigan71 had burned an occupied house, he was
tried on charges of burning “other real property,” which is set
out in a different section of the statute.  At the conclusion of the
prosecution’s case, Evans moved for a directed verdict of acquit-
tal on the theory that an essential element of the offense was
that the structure was not a dwelling house, and the State had
failed to meet its burden.  The trial court granted the motion.
As it turned out, the trial judge misinterpreted state law.  Burn-
ing “other real property” is a lesser included offense, and the
State is not required to disprove
the greater offense.  Does the
Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
hibit retrial?  In an 8-1 decision,
the Supreme Court said it does.
Justice Sotomayor’s majority
opinion is a primer on long-
standing principles of double-
jeopardy law.  The Double Jeop-
ardy Clause forbids a retrial fol-
lowing a court-decreed acquittal
even if it is based on an erro-
neous foundation.  A mistaken
acquittal is still an acquittal.  It
is unreviewable whether a judge
directs a jury to return a verdict of not guilty or enters the ver-
dict herself.  The acquittal precludes retrial even if it is based on
an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, a mistaken under-
standing of the evidence required for conviction, or a miscon-
struction of the statute defining the requirements to convict.
While there may be a retrial following a procedural dismissal as
opposed to a substantive ruling, here the trial court evaluated
the State’s evidence.72 The Court’s prior decisions “all instruct
that an acquittal due to insufficient evidence precludes retrial,
whether the Court’s evaluation of the evidence was ‘correct or
not.’”73 The majority rejected the State’s arguments for a differ-
ent outcome in the case at bench; among other things, it was
unpersuaded that the erroneous addition of an extraneous ele-
ment of the offense was any different than a simple misinter-
pretation or misconstruction of the statute. And it did not mat-
ter that the acquittal was sought by the defendant.  Justice Alito
was the sole dissenter.74
SPEEDY TRIAL
Finally, in Boyer v. Louisiana,75 the Court dismissed the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.  The Court
had accepted the case to determine whether the State’s failure to
fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years should be
weighed against the State for speedy trial purposes.  Justice
Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurred in the
order of dismissal, saying that the record did not show that
much of the delay was caused by the State, and thus review had
been granted on the basis of a mistaken factual premise.76 Four
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justices dissented.  They con-
cluded that delay resulting from a
State’s failure to fund an indigent’s
defense should weigh against the
State and that any remaining fac-
tual issues could be resolved on
remand.77
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EX
POST FACTO CLAUSE
The Court decided three cases
that relate to the retroactive appli-
cation of law.  The retroactivity
issues were assessed under different legal principles—habeas
doctrine, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Due Process
Clause—but it seems appropriate to consider them together.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL/ADVICE ABOUT IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES
Three Terms ago, the Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky,78 and
held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel includes the right to advice on the immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea, at least where the consequences of the
conviction are clear.  Lower courts split on the question whether
Padilla applies retroactively.  In Chaidez v. United States,79 the
justices found that the decision was not applicable to people
whose convictions became final before Padilla was announced.
Writing for six members of the Court, Justice Kagan analyzed
the retroactivity question under the framework of Teague v.
Lane.80 A decision is not applied retroactively if it is a “new
rule,” meaning one which “breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation” on the government.81 A case sets forth a new rule “if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.”82 Padilla, said the Court,
would not have created a new rule had it only applied Strickland
v. Washington’s83 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard to a
new factual situation.  But Padilla did more.  It “considered a
threshold question: Was advice about deportation ‘categorically
removed’ from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel because it involved only a ‘collateral consequence’ of a con-
viction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence?”84
Padilla’s holding about the former distinction between direct and
collateral consequences points to the conclusion that it
announced a new rule.85 Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
ment only, maintaining that Padilla was wrongly decided.86
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissented.  In their view,
“Padilla is built squarely on the foundation laid out by Strick-
land” and “relied upon controlling precedent.”87 The dissent-
ing justices were not persuaded that Padilla’s discussion of
direct and collateral consequences indicated that it was estab-
lishing a new rule.  They contended that the Padilla Court said
it had never previously distinguished between direct and col-
lateral consequences in defining the scope of effective assis-
tance of counsel, and the Padilla majority expressly declined to
consider whether that distinction was appropriate in that
case.88 The dissenters argued that “[w]hat truly appears to
drive the majority’s analysis is its sense that Padilla occasioned
a serious disruption in lower court decisional reasoning. . . . But
the fact that a decision was perceived as momentous or conse-
quential, particularly by those who disagreed with it, does not
control in the Teague analysis.”89
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
The petitioner in Peugh v. United States90 committed bank
fraud in 1999 and 2000.  In 2010, he received a sentence of 70
months in federal prison.  Peugh claimed that his sentence vio-
lated the Ex Post Facto Clause91 because the judge applied the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines range in effect at the time of sen-
tencing (70-87 months) rather than the range in effect when
the offense was committed (30-37 months).  The Ex Post Facto
Clause prohibits—among other things—laws “that change[]
the punishment, and inflict[] a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed.”92 Did the Guide-
lines amendment accomplish such a change, inasmuch as the
Court decided in United States v. Booker93 that the Guidelines
are advisory, not mandatory? In a 5-4 opinion written by Jus-
tice Sotomayor, the Court said yes.
Critical to the majority was the understanding that it is not
necessary for a law to increase the defendant’s maximum eligi-
ble sentence in order to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Nor
does the fact that the sentencing court has a degree of discretion
defeat such a claim, though the possibility must be more than
mere speculation.  “The touchstone” of the inquiry is whether
the change in law “presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’”94 Jus-
tice Sotomayor explained that while the Guidelines are advi-
sory, the sentencing judge uses the range as the starting point in
the analysis.  “That a district court may ultimately sentence a
given defendant outside the Guidelines range does not deprive
the Guidelines of force as the framework for sentencing.”95
Moreover, the significance of the Guidelines is underscored by
the fact that appellate review for reasonableness uses the Guide-
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lines as a benchmark, and a mistake in calculating the Guide-
lines is procedural error.  Contrary to the government’s argu-
ments, the majority considered the Guidelines to have more
force than merely nonbinding policy statements.  In the end,
the Court saw this case as closest to Miller v. Florida,96 where a
change in Florida’s guidelines scheme was held to violate the
Clause. Florida’s guidelines provided a presumptive sentencing
range, and clear and convincing reasons had to be given for a
departure from that range.  The majority in Peugh concluded
that applying the amended Guidelines to the defendant violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause.97
Justice Thomas wrote the dissent, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia and Alito.  They countered the majority’s
claim that the Guidelines were more like binding law because
an incorrect calculation is reversible error.  In the dissenters’
view, “the fact that courts must give due consideration to the
recommendation expressed in the correct Guidelines does not
mean that the Guidelines constrain the district court’s discre-
tion to impose an appropriate sentence; it simply means that
district courts must consider the correct variables before exer-
cising their discretion.”98 Moreover, “[i]t is difficult to see how
an advisory Guideline, designed to lead courts to impose sen-
tences more in line with fixed statutory objectives, could ever
constitute an ex post facto violation.”99 Writing for himself in
another part of his opinion, Justice Thomas contended that the
opinion also demonstrated the unworkability of the Court’s ex
post facto jurisprudence, and that the Court should return to
the original meaning of the Clause.  He argued that the justices
should not adhere to prior cases that find a violation when there
is a sufficient “risk” of an increased sentence.100
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE—RETROACTIVITY
While the Ex Post Facto Clause does not measure the retroac-
tive application of a judicial decision, the Due Process Clause
does.  In Metrish v. Lancaster,101 a federal habeas corpus peti-
tioner challenged the retroactive application of a decision from
the Michigan Supreme Court.  Beginning in 1973, Michigan’s
intermediate appellate courts began recognizing a diminished-
capacity defense to negate the mens rea element of first-degree
murder.  In 1975, the Michigan Legislature passed a law that set
forth the requirements of a defense based upon mental illness or
mental retardation. The 1975 Act was amended in 1994, to clar-
ify who bore the burden of proof.  In 2001, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that defendants could not raise diminished
capacity, as it was not included within Michigan’s comprehen-
sive statutory scheme.  Lancaster’s offense took place in 1993. At
his trial, the judge applied the 2001 decision retroactively and
denied Lancaster’s request to present evidence of diminished
capacity.  In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court found that Lancaster was
not entitled to habeas corpus
relief.
The Court compared Lan-
caster’s claim to the two primary
precedents, Bouie v. City of
Columbia102 and Rogers v. Ten-
nessee.103 Bouie was not on
point; there, a decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court
was retroactively applied to
make an act criminal that was
otherwise not proscribed.  Rogers was closer. In that case, the
Tennessee Supreme Court retroactively abolished the common-
law “year-and-a-day rule” in murder cases. The decision not to
adhere to the rule in Rogers’s case did not violate the Due
Process Clause principle of fair warning because the rule was
widely viewed as an outdated relic, and had only a tenuous
foothold in Tennessee.  Lancaster’s claim “is arguably less weak”
than that rejected in Rogers, since diminished capacity was not
an outdated relic and has been acknowledged repeatedly by the
Michigan Court of Appeals.104 However, Lancaster could not
meet the demanding standards required for federal habeas cor-
pus relief.  He would need to establish an unreasonable appli-
cation of federal law.  And “[d]istinguishing Rogers, a case in
which we rejected a due process claim, . . . does little to bolster
Lancaster’s argument that the [state court’s] decision unreason-
ably applied clearly established federal law . . . This Court has
never found a due process violation in circumstances remotely
resembling Lancaster’s case . . . .”105
DUE PROCESS—BURDEN OF PROOF
The Court also decided an interesting case about the assign-
ment of the burden of proof.  The defendant in Smith v. United
States106 was charged with conspiracy and other crimes relating
to his alleged role in a drug distribution organization.  He
claimed that the conspiracy counts were barred by the five-year
statute of limitations, pointing to the fact that he was in prison
on other charges for the last six years of the charged conspiracy.
The trial court instructed the jury that the burden is on the
defendant to prove withdrawal from a conspiracy by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.  On appeal, he argued that it was the
government’s burden to disprove a defensive withdrawal before
the limitations period.  In an opinion by Justice Scalia for a
unanimous Court, the justices disagreed.
The opinion rehearsed the relevant basic principles.  While
the Due Process Clause assigns the government the burden of
proving every fact necessary to constitute the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative
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defenses is not constitutionally
required.  The prosecution is fore-
closed from shifting the burden to
the defendant only when an affir-
mative defense negates an element
of crime.  However, where an affir-
mative defense instead excuses
conduct that would otherwise be
punishable, but does not negate
any of the elements of the offense
itself, the government does not
have a constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.  The Court found that withdrawal did not
negate an element of Smith’s conspiracy crime.  “Commission
of the crime within the statute-of-limitations period is not an ele-
ment of the conspiracy offense.”107 Thus, “[w]ithdrawal termi-
nates the defendant’s liability for postwithdrawal acts of his co-
conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy.”108 In
another part of the opinion, the Court noted that Congress was
free to alter the assignment of proof with respect to the exis-
tence or nonexistence of withdrawal.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
One federal criminal appeal, United States v. Davila,109 may
be of interest.110 While it primarily involves the construction of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, it also briefly discusses
the sorts of errors that are considered to be structural.
The defendant in Davila was dissatisfied with his legal rep-
resentation, and complained that his attorney had advised him
to plead guilty.  In what all parties later agreed was a clear vio-
lation of Rule 11(c)(1), the Magistrate Judge essentially urged
him to plead guilty and cooperate with the government in this
or other cases.  He said that to obtain the sentence reduction for
“acceptance of responsibility,” which is regularly given defen-
dants who plead guilty, Davila had to “come to the cross.”111
Davila pleaded guilty several months later. The Supreme Court
unanimously held that any Rule 11 violation of this type is
assessed for harmless error; reversal is not automatic.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg first noted that Rule
11(h) specifically provides that a variance from the rule “is
harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights.”112 The
justices rejected the claim that this type of violation, which
occurs before a defendant decides whether to plead guilty,
should be treated differently than the sort of procedural errors
that can occur during a plea colloquy.  Under the plain language
of Rule 11, and consistent with the Advisory Committee’s com-
mentary, both are amenable to review for harmless error.
“Structural error” refers to a very limited class of errors that
“trigger automatic reversal because they undermine the fairness
of a criminal proceeding as a whole,” and this error does not fit
within that category.113 The Court remanded for the lower
courts to assess the error in light of the full record.  Justices
Scalia and Thomas concurred.  They agreed that a defendant
must be prejudiced to obtain relief, but would have reached that
conclusion by applying the plain language of Rule 11, without
reference to the Advisory Committee’s comments.114
HABEAS CORPUS
There are several noteworthy federal habeas cases from the
last Term.  The Court took on the question of competency and
habeas, as well as a more ordinary set of cases concerning pro-
cedural default and habeas practice under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
RIGHT TO COMPETENCE
Does a federal habeas corpus petitioner, who is challenging
a state capital conviction, have a right to stay the habeas pro-
ceeding if he is not competent to proceed?  In Ryan v. Gonzales
and Tibbals v. Carter,115 the Court said no.
The case arose from two separate habeas corpus petitions,
one in the Sixth Circuit and one in the Ninth.  The Courts of
Appeals both stayed the proceedings, albeit on the basis of dif-
ferent statutory provisions. The Court’s unanimous opinion,
written by Justice Thomas, found no statutory basis for a stay.
There is no right to competence in the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3599,
the statute that provides federal habeas petitioners on death
row the right to federally funded counsel.  Nor may such a right
be implied from the statutory right to counsel—that would not
be consistent with the Court’s constitutional precedents.  An
incompetent defendant may not be tried, but that protection
stems from the Due Process Clause.  The Court has never said
it is derived from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Fur-
ther, a right to competence cannot be found in 18 U.S.C. §
4241, which generally applies only to federal criminal defen-
dants (not state defendants who become federal habeas peti-
tioners).  The Court did, however, note that District Courts
have discretion to grant stays.  In one of the cases, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay, because all
of the claims were record-based or resolvable as a matter of law,
irrespective of the petitioner’s competence.  In the other case,
the Court remanded to determine whether there is a likelihood
that the petitioner will regain competence in the foreseeable
United States v.
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future and whether the claim could substantially benefit from
his assistance.
What is most interesting about this opinion is how it con-
ceives the role of the federal courts in capital habeas cases.
“Given the backward-looking, record-based nature of most fed-
eral habeas proceedings, counsel can generally provide effective
representation to a habeas petitioner regardless of the peti-
tioner’s competence.”116 Citing Cullen v. Pinholster117 and Har-
rington v. Richter,118 the justices emphasized that review is usu-
ally limited to the record that was before the state court.119
“Attorneys are quite capable of reviewing the state-court record,
identifying legal errors, and marshaling relevant arguments,
even without their clients’ assistance.”120
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT/PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
A few procedural default cases are worth a brief mention.  In
McQuiggin v. Perkins,121 the Court ruled 5-4 that “actual inno-
cence,” if proved, can provide a gateway to federal habeas cor-
pus review, even if the petitioner failed to file her petition
within AEDPA’s one-year limitations period.  Trevino v. Thaler122
provided an opportunity to revisit Martinez v. Ryan,123 which
was decided last Term. In Martinez, a state law required a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to be raised in an initial-
review collateral proceeding (instead of on direct review), and
the Court found that ineffective assistance of state counsel in
the collateral proceeding may excuse the failure to raise the
claim about trial counsel.  The Trevino Court examined Texas’s
procedural system and determined that it does not offer most
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.  In a 5-4 rul-
ing, the justices found no distinction between (1) a system
“that denies permission to raise the claim on direct appeal” and
(2) a system “that in theory grants permission but, as a matter
of procedural design and systemic operation, denies a mean-
ingful opportunity to do so . . . .”124
The Court also addressed the circumstance in which a state
criminal defendant attempts to raise a federal claim and a state
court rules against the defendant in an opinion that addresses
some issues but does not expressly address the federal claim.  In
Johnson v. Williams, the justices held that a federal habeas court
“must presume (subject to rebuttal) that the federal claim was
adjudicated on the merits.”125 The justices were unanimous in
finding that the presumption was not rebutted simply because
the state court addressed some but not all of the claims.  The
opinion noted that “it is not
the uniform practice of busy
state courts to discuss sepa-
rately every single claim to
which a defendant makes
even a passing reference.”126
While the Court found that
the presumption was not
rebutted, it also rejected the
State’s argument that the pre-
sumption should be made
irrebuttable.  Justice Scalia
concurred, arguing that the
presumption should only be
rebuttable by a showing,
based on the text of the
court’s order or upon practice
in the jurisdiction, that the
judgment did not purport to decide the federal question.127
Finally, during the 2011-12 Term, the Court granted certio-
rari and summarily reversed in six habeas corpus cases.  As I
wrote a year ago, the justices did so to underscore AEDPA’s
demanding standards.128 This year, the justices continued the
practice, but with fewer cases—three—all from the Ninth Cir-
cuit.  In Marshall v. Rodgers,129 they reversed the Circuit’s grant
of habeas relief, finding that there is no clearly established Fed-
eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court, with respect to a
criminal defendant’s ability to reassert his right to counsel once
he has validly waived it.  The Court criticized the Court of
Appeals for its “mistaken belief that circuit precedent may be
used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court
jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that this Court has not
announced.”130 Another summary reversal came in Nevada v.
Jackson,131 where the state courts excluded evidence of a rape
victim’s prior uncorroborated allegations of rape by the defen-
dant, largely because the accused did not give notice of his
intent to introduce extrinsic evidence.  While it is well-estab-
lished, as a general principle, that a defendant has a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense, “[n]o decision of
this Court clearly establishes that this notice requirement is
unconstitutional.”132 Finally, in Ryan v. Schad,133 the justices
ruled that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in failing
to issue its mandate after Supreme Court review was denied; the
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A LOOK AHEAD
As this article goes to press, the Court’s 2013 Term has just
begun.  It is still quite early for a full preview, but there are a few
cases to watch.  The justices will consider whether the Fifth
Amendment is violated when a State uses a court-ordered men-
tal evaluation to rebut a capital defendant’s showing about his
mental state;134 whether the government can obtain an ex parte
order to freeze assets that a defendant needs to retain counsel,
and not provide a pretrial, adversarial hearing on the underly-
ing charges;135 if officers who receive an anonymous tip about a
drunk or reckless driver need to corroborate dangerous driving
before stopping the vehicle;136 what standards and relief are
appropriate for a claim that a defendant would have pled guilty
but for ineffective assistance of counsel;137 and whether a resi-
dent must be personally present to object when officers ask a
cotenant for consent to search a dwelling, or whether a previ-
ous objection remains effective.138 It should be another inter-
esting year.
Charles D. Weisselberg is the Shannon C. Turner
Professor of Law at the University of California,
Berkeley, where he has taught since 1998.  He
served at the University of Southern California
School of Law from 1987 to 1998, and was pre-
viously in public and private practice.  Weissel-
berg was the founding director of Berkeley Law’s
in-house clinical program, and is currently the
Associate Dean for the J.D. Curriculum.  He teaches criminal pro-
cedure, criminal law, and other oddities.  Weisselberg received his
B.A. from The Johns Hopkins University in 1979 and his J.D. from
the University of Chicago in 1982.  He is grateful for the skilled
research assistance of Eugene Chao.
188 Court Review - Volume 49 
